The accepted rationale for abandonment ofthe Susu Mission in the Rio Pongo in 1817 in favor of Freetown has generally converged on seven circumstances existing in 1816-17 when transfer of activities to Freetown occurred. These included perceptions that 1) the Pongo and neighboting areas among the Northern Rivers were particularly unfriendly to missionaries because Islam was expanding into these areas and because traders located there continued both to trade in slaves and to believe that missionaries reported their slave trading activities to authorities at Freetown; 2) recent setbacks (in the form of where he was co-opted to become chaplain after the dearh ofJohn Clarke in 1798. Officials at Freetown claimed rhat Brunton neglected his duties as chaplain due to frequent illnesses and his continuing and intensive study of the Susu language, and Brunton returned to Britain in 1801 to convalesce. By any measure, however, it was Brunton's subsequent accomplishments that most influenced the choice ofa specific mission target for eMS missionary efforts from Sierra Leone. Brunton had returned to England with several Susu boys ftom rhe Rio Pongo region, one ofwhom was named JeliotUm Harrison. a member ofan important trading family with marriage alliances among rhe Ormonds of rhe uppet Rio Pongo, Fetnandezes ofrhe Dembia Rivet area, and Gomezes ofrhe lower Rio Pongo." Brunton used Harrison and orhers and rheit native knowledge ofSusu to elaborate his already broad list ofwords and grammatical constructs, and to develop his certainty that Susu was spoken widely in rhe intetior ofWest Africa, and should thus be rhe language used to convert Africans to Christianity. Brunton also visited the newly formed African academy near Clapham Common that was established in 1799 to educate twenty sons of chiefS and traders btought by Macaulay when he returned to England in 1799. Brunton's list and his notions were published widely.15 His conclusions that Susu would and should be the language of conversion. that studeots at the Clapham school would be a vanguatd leading to an African renaissance, and that future missions in Africa should be Africa focused. were widely studied and accepted in British circles. This was especially true among members of the Clapham Sect; among evangelicals who were then attempting to end the slave trade from Africa; and among founders of the Church Missionary Society. Even Zachary Macaulay, who had encouraged missionary B. L. Mouser /Journal ofReligion in Africa 39 (2009) 5 efforts outside of Freetown during and after his tenure as governor of Sierra Leone but who had also sought to contain missionary enthusiasm that he considered harmful to the settlement's welfare, had recognized the Susu language as a crucial part of mission success by 1799. 16 Most importantly. however, Macaulay believed that missionaries would need to acquire the 'gift of tongues'. otherwise their efforts would be fruitless. 17 Perhaps his negative experience with the families that accompanied him to Africa in 1796 dampened his fervor, knowing that missionaries could not be allowed to establish missions without a concurrent company and colonial commitment to rescue them if that should be required. Simply put, missionaries were not to venture too far from Freetown, and were not to be permitted to create more problems for the settlement than Freetown was willing and able to resolve.
Macaulay's return to Britain in mid-1799 coincided with the beginnings of a missionary society affiliated with the Established Church and with a change of administration at Sierra Leone, both of which set the course of missionary ventures in West Africa for the next decade. IS That is not to say that Macaulay was the principal voice in that society's formulation. As Walls and others have amply noted, the latter decades of the eighteenth century in Britain were filled with significant discussion and debate concerning the purpose of missions, and particularly the proper character and role of missionaries. Here is not the place to define those twists and turns of argument, but it suffices to point out that the founders of the Church Missionary Society (originally called the 'Society for Missions in Africa and the East instituted by Members of the Established Church') were familiar with the writings ofHorne and others, and were aware offailures experienced by other societies. Horne had recommended sending missionaries in groups, having British societies as organizational sponsors and support bases, sending only unmarried persons into the field, avoiding linkages to governmental polities, and shunning relationships with commerce. Horne believed that ideally a society should avoid any formal connection with a particular religious denomination and suggested that an ecumenical mission should be designed to serve the (Church Universal'. The founders of the Society, on the other hand, came primarily from the Established Church and from members of the Eclectic Society and the Clapham Sect, and their objective was to bring an evangelical bent to the Church's ministry. Arguments and disagreements were many.19 All, however, were intent on achieving 'the conversion of the heathen everywhere to Christianity'.20
The most prominent figure in the Society was the Reverend John Venn, rector of Clapham. This was an era of 'providential· theology', with the theological debate centering on questions ofwhether Providence was to be defined as 'divine intention' or 'progressive evolution'. The Reverend Thomas Scott, 26 Once at Freetown, however) the governor provided them housing near the chapel rather than in a native town and thus reduced their ability to study African languages. Renner as mission superior accommodated quickly to his new bur temporary role as chaplain, and he established a close working and civil arrangement with Ludlam and the settlement's leadership. Hartwig, on rhe orher hand, had married on rhe eve ofhis departure from England, and he and his wife Sarah lived a life largely apart from Renner and orhers. Sarah taught school while Hartwig increasingly focused on the Susu mission aheadcollecting and ordering material for the future assignment, connecting with Africans visiting the settlement and in neighboring villages, and studying the Susu and Arabic languages. 27 Thar single-minded focus, wherher naively reached or deliberarely provocative, produced a breach between Renner/Ludlam and Hartwig, wirh rhe consequence that boisterous arguments resulted, to the point that settlers clustered outside Hartwig's house to listen to their confrontations. Their disagreements lay mainly in the definition ofProvidence and in a lack ofagreement tegarding specific instructions given them by the Society. Renner believed in the idea of 'patience in waiting), while Hartwig ascribed to the position that one must seize an opportunity when it presents itself They also disagreed on the instructions they had been given-were they to remain no longer than ooe year at Freetown (by 1807 they had been in Fteerown for mote than two years, and Renner had never ventured far beyond the setdement's boundaries); were they to focus their efforts on the chaplaincy; or wefe they to prepare enthusiastically for a mission in Susu Country and serve the settlement's needs in the meantime? Hartwig and Renner had differed with each other on points of doctrine while in Germany, so it was apparently nothing new for disagreements to continue at Freetown. 28 For Governor Ludlam, however, and for Macaulay and Venn in London, these disagreements among missionaries were embarrassing and troubling. In London Venn was shepherding a new society that had no experience to guide it, and its members were confused by what they read in letters from Africa. Ludlam saw the missionary problem in Freetown more as a question of disobedience or disregard for authority. and Macaulay in London consistently championed his protege at Freetown. Ludlam had had his share of troublesome setders, and he certainly did not telish the additional problem of shepherding irritable missionaries who would soon be leaving the settlement. Nor did he welcome the prospect of missionaries moving into areas of the coast where their presence might actually incite Africans against the settlement and its commerce. His experience after the Nova Scotian Rebellion and reports from Smith and Bright who had visited Susu Country in 1802 confirmed that Muslim leaders there would consider Christian missionaries to be natural religious enemies and would oppose any proselytizing within their territories. 29 Back in London there were those who wished that the missionaries would reconcile and that missions would move swiftly forward, but there also were those of 'worldly policy' as represented by Macaulay and Dawes who cautioned that missionaries could not 'itinerate', as Horne and others had proposed, without an accompanying and overwhelming colonial presence to sustain and protect them. 3O This simmering debate in London also included the sentiment that it had been a mistake to have the missionaries remain in Freetown for so long a period, since once in Freetown they seemingly became captives to the needs-the 'trap'-<lf the setdement. Nearly all repotts from Mrica seemed to support Renner's explanation for delay and to blame HartWig for the continuing troubles there.
This debate became critical when three additional missionaries-Leopold Butschet, Gustavus Nylander, Johann Prasse, again all Getmans and Luther- ans-arrived in Sierra Leone in September 1806. this time with instructions from the Society to leave the setdement as soon as possible. Hartwig. who arrived back in Freetown after a period of residence in Mandingo Country interpreted their arrival, their willingness to listen to his complaints and their new mandate as vindication for his opinion that it was time to establish the mission and for missionaries to leave Freetown. For Ludlam, their arrival mainly meant that he now had five unhappy missionaries in his midst rather than just two. The Society's new instructions to the missionaries also specified that they were to receive guidance from London rather than the settlement's administration, effectively leaving Ludlam out of the administrative loop and without authority to supervise their activities upon the coast. 31 Meanwhile, both Ludlam and Macaulay were convinced that missions would fail anywhere along the coast ifslave trading continued, and both believed that it was better to postpone the establishment of missions until slave trading had been made illegal.
The new missionaries also faced a dilemma-who was to be believed about circumstances at Sierra Leone? Renner explained to them that he had remained compliant to Ludlam's guidance because it was 'not yet the time ofconverting the Susoos'." Hartwig bitterly complained that Ludlam/Renner had ridiculed and marginalized him, and that Renner had become too willing a pawn to settlement and Company needs. Whether a result of proximity or of prior disposition, the newcomers began to take sides in their dispute. Buescher accompanied Brighr during his visit to Susu/Mandingo Country in 1806, and during that period he listened carefully and singly to arguments supporting the Company and Renner's position. Ludlam also sent three missionaries. Renner, Buescher and Prasse. to Mandingo Country to remove them from Freetown and away from Hartwig, to give them experience in using the Susu language and to introduce them to African customs and climate. That visit placed Renner and Buescher together for several months, during which time Renner recruited Butscher to his cause. Ludlam also gave the missionaries unique instructions regarding their expected behavior while within Mandingo Country: they were not to mention the fact that they were missionaries, were not to itinerate, were not to proselytize, and were ordered to identifY themselves only as reachers, but they could engage in small trade. Nylander, in contrast, remained in Freetown where he was elevated to the post of temporary chaplain, although he was scarcely fluent in spoken English. He wondered why thar task was denied Hartwig, and he marveled that the Society had sent them to such a 'rerrible place', stating that had he known beforehand he would never have come to Africa.
33
It was during this period ofseparation that Hartwig committed an error in judgment that brought with it an ultimatum and a dramatic change ofcourse But having succeeded with tespect to Hartwig, Ludlam ptessed his advantage. In lettetS written to the parent Society in Febtuary 1807 to justifY his action or inaction, Ludlam argued that the Society's leadetShip had denied him authority to supervise the missionaries on the coast; as a consequence he and the local committee considered their role vis-a.-vis the Society as terminated, although he noted that persons at Freetown might still assist the missionaries but only as individuals. Before these letters arrived in London, however, the parent Society's general committee met on 21 April and resolved six items: 1) that all missionaries would be of equal tank; 2) that Fantimani's town in the Rio Pongo was designated as the Societ}ls only mission site; 3) that Renner would remain in Freetown as chaplain; 4) that no correspondence coming from missionaries would be censured or read by anyone at Free· town; 5) that salaries would be paid ditectly by the Society and not thtough the Company; and 6) that all stores wete to be equally divided. A copy of these 9/2512009 10:24:02 AM I resolutions, which effectively separated the Society's efforts upon the coast from attachments to the colony, and a letter of strong reprimand to Renner regarding his mistreatment of Hartwig arrived in Freetown on 28 June, and Buescher informed Ludlam and Smith oftheir contents one day later. Ludlam was furious. From his perspective, the Society had formally removed the missionaries from any linkage to the Company and, perhaps most gallingly, the Society now felt able to dictate who would be chaplain at the settlement. Ludlaru fully tecognized that the Society had accepted Hartwig's intetptetation of circumstances upon the coast and not those ofeither Ludlam or Renner. Ludlam immediately infonned the missionaries that the committee of laymen! advisors at Freetown that had been formed before the first missionaries arrived in 1804 no longer existed, and that as governor he would still provide the missionaries with financial assistance but only so long as 'all remain together in the Colony'."
NyHinder. clearly the most temperate voice among the remaining missionaries. described this period as 'a very remarkable crisis'. Elsewhere he used terms such as 'alarmed'. 'put in a most critical condition', 'left without any support whatever'. 'great distress', and 'a melancholy Situation'..% Between 28 June and 1July. the four remaining missionaries met to find a resolution to their collective dilemma. In their jointly signed report to the Society dared I July and in letters written separately over the next few days, they found common ground. In that teport they concluded that Hartwig had disobeyed Ludlaru and had left Fteetown without apptoval, thar he had told the Society many lies and 'falsehoods', that he had never been a true Chtistian, that he had become a missionary only to escape conscription in Germany and that he had left Freetown with the intention of becoming a slave trader. This consensuseffectively a reevaluation-represented a significant reconstruction of memory. It also represented a major reversal at Freetown that needed close evaluation by the Society's General Committee once theit repot< of I July teaehed london in September.
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At a 12 October meeting of the CMS General Committee, Alexander Macaulay, btother to Zaehary and recently arrived from Fteetown, described Renner as the injured and innocent party and Hartwig as the troublemaker. With Hartwig removed from Freetown, with a resolution of sorts between the Society and the officials at Freetown finally arranged, and with the certainty that the Company would rdinquish authority over Sierra Leone to the government in 1808, it was time to give serious consideration to actually establishing the Susu Mission in the Rio Pongo. By happensrance, only six days alter the 12 October 1807 meeting in London Burscher arrived at Fantimani's town in the upper Rio Pongo to survey the promised site and to formalize the beginnings of a mission settlement at KacaralCanofee. What Buescher found instead were an impoverished Fantimani, small villages, and major disappointment. But while at Kacara a friendly American trader offered him the nearby property at Bassaya of a British trader who had recently died, and 'the deed of gift was signed' on 22 January 1808 fur a propetty that contained at least five houses, a store, four houses for servants, and extensive gardens, all on the conditions that the missionaries establish a school, that the donor's children be permitted to attend it, and that instruction be given in English rather than Susu. If there was any problem with the Rio Pongo site it was the fundamental issue of slave trading. and whether recently passed laws in both the United Scates and Britain would halt the trade for its subjects or whether it would continue. Macaulay was convinced that missions could not succeed if slave trading persisted. Slaving commerce in the Rio Pongo had been robust during 1807 as ftightened traders sold off their stocks of marketbound slaves, with some retiring from the trade altogether and others adoptĩ ng a wait~and~see attitude for changes that might come after anti~slaving By 1812 there were nearly 120 children under the care of the various missions, but no instruction was yet being given in the Susu language, and not a single church had been built. By 1815 a roral ofsixteen persons had been sent out from London-missionaries, laymen and wives, and two Africans. Richard Wilkinson and Jellorum Harrison, who had studied scripture in England and who were related to many notable trading and regal families in the Rio Pongo and Dembia River. Of those sixteen, thirteen were Germans; seven of those died of rropical diseases." Both Sarah and Peter Harrwig (the latter having survived more than seven years ofexile in Mandingo Counery) returned to Two major problems confronted the missionaries in the Pongas Mission that made their progress and their relationship to influential traders and headmen increasingly difficult. One concerned the continuing slave trade. As noted earlier, Macaulay and Ludlam believed that missions could not succeed while slave trading flourished, and the Rio Pongo was one of the last areas along this section of coast where local geographical features helped to make that possible. 44 For a time, Britain and America had adopted plans to stop the trade by seizing the vessels and captains violating laws that prohibited it. Resourceful captains soon found a way around those proscriptions by carrying flags and papers identifying themselves and their vessels as something other than British or American. Once it became evident to British officials that slave trading could continue under this device, officials adopted a new policy of punishing those British and American traders who resided within the rivers, arresting and trying a few to send the message that attempts to halt slave trading on the high seas had been joined by raids against trading posts and traders who continued to engage in that commerce. When Major Charles Maxwell became governor of Sierra Leone in 1811 (1811-1814) and initiated his program to stop slave trading within the rivers by launching raids against that commerce at its source, he found the missionaries to be willing allies in the rivers. The problem for the missionaries was the perception or, rather, the certainty that the missionaries were reporting to Freetown the names ofslave trading vessels when they arrived in the rivers in search of cargoes and the names of Pongo-based traders and headmen who were still involved in that commerce. 45 Missionaries also wrote letters to the Society that described their trials and tribulations, as well as their meager mission successes. In its efforts to increase donations from contributors in Britain, the Society fittingly circulated parts of those letters, many containing comments regarding events and conditions in the rivers, but with names of traders and headmen judiciously extracted. 46 Gradually, however, those publications reached the hands of the traders and African headmen whose misdeeds were being described in graphic detail. The relationship between the missionaries and many of those traders and headmen located around them turned hostile. Local children were removed from the schools, with the consequence that missionaries were increasingly left with a majority that consisted only of those redeemed from slavery, orphans, or imported from the Sierra Leone settlement where large numbers of slaves taken from captured slave ships were being unloaded. In effect, the Society's 912512009 10:24:02 AM I mission to spread the Gospel to native peoples in Susu Country was contracting rather than expanding.
A second and no less critical problem involved the continuing lack of harm ony among the missionaries themselves. Hartwig and Renner had written harsh (some might say terrifying) things about each other. and that circumstance continued with the new missionaries as well. Instead ofa single mission station where all missionaries were given separate tasks, the Pongas Mission appears to have evolved on a far different model. 'While coordination existed, for all practical purposes. five separate missions were in play. Each missionary acted as superior in his own mission station, and each vied with the others for resources, choice of children. access to London and the Society and respect and influence. Unfortunately, most of those things were in short supply. While one might argue that the missionaries were at fault for this dilemma, one might equally contend that the Society was in the process of developing its own policies and that distance, time and distractions with missions established elsewhere left the missionaries in the Pongas without adequate guidance from the parent Society.
At the height of the struggle between Hartwig and Renner, Hartwig had written an appeal, pleading that the Society send someone to Freetown to survey conditions because he did not trust anyone around him to provide the Socicty with a truthful rcport. That circumstance increasingly repeated itselfas the Pongas Mission continued, but this time it was Renner and Butscher who asked for an official visit from someone directly connected to the Society in London. After the arrival of missionaries Charles Wenzel and John Wilhelm in 1814, the missionaries bitterly criticized each other in letters, accusing othẽ rs ofexcessive drinking, attempting to become superiors, pilfering or wasting resources. lying, not being good Christians, wasteful efforts and so forthY Several lay persons at Freetown who were listened to by members of the Society's General Committee in London, added to this turmoil by characterizing the mission effort in the Pongo as wasteful, useless, and unproductive among a people that even Venn described as unappreciative; their portrayals of the missionaries themselves wete often equally harsh.
Whether in frustration and desperation or in an effort to return harmony to the mission and its personnel, Richard Bickersteth. who was then assistants ecretary to the Society, sailed for Sierra Leone in January 1816 and spent three months visiting outposts on the Rio Pongo and Dembia River, and Freetown in Sierra Leone. His task was simply stated: 'To inspect the Mission, and gather such information as should enable the Society to put their affairs on a better footing, and enlarge their efforts with fresh zeal':f8 He listened missionaries move to Freetown. where they could be protected and be of greater service. The home Society was friendly to this suggestion, hut it also believed that its ptimary mission should fitst setve the Africans, that changes in slave trading might bring positive adjustments in the Pango. and that it still might be possible to serve both objectives. Undetected, MacCarthy took this one step finthet early in 1815 by announcing that no new Liberated Africans would be taken from Freetown to the Pongo fot schooling. 51 MacCarthy explained to Bicketsteth that the physical and commercial climates within the Pongo were not advantageous to continued missionary efforts there. that slave trading continued and was actually increasing, that educating Africans in the Pongo would mainly assist the slave traders and continue that commerce, and that restoring buildings that had been mysteriously destroyed would represent a useless commitment of resources in an area where Christianity had little chance ofsucceeding. At the same time. he argued that he could scarcely send children from Freetown to the Pongo whete they might be tecaptuted and sold again into the slave trade. He thus suggested a move to Freetown where children who had become Christians would live in a Christian environment and could maintain their commitment to Christianity more easily than in the Pongo. 52 Bickersteth returned to Britain a convert to MacCarthy's vision. but with the pOSSible caveat that the Pongas Mission would continue. and that it might be necessary to significantly increase the Society's efforts there if success were to be expected. In effect, however, Bickersteth and the Society placed the fate of the mission in the hands of the missionaries; whether to maintain or abandon it was left to their discretion.53
That choice was decided largely as a consequence ofevents in the Rio Pongo between Decembet 1816 and Match 1817. Rennet had gone to Fteetown, and while there had reported to Governor MacCarthy that a slaving vessel had entered the river and was collecting a cargo. Partly in response to that information, a British royal squadron vessel followed a suspected. slaver into the Rio Pongo on I January, captured it at Lisso, which was located neat the Bassaya mission station, and ordered local headmen to surrender the vessel's crew and cargo within a month's time. The seizure of the slaver and the momentary retreat of the squadron vessel to the nearby coast to await compliance with its order set the stage for a major crisis for the missionaries. Headmen who directly profited from continued slave trading amassed warriors and weapons for the upcoming encounter with British forces, and, foHowing protocols accepted in the river and as landlords to slave traders as well as the missionaries, they requested ammunition from the missionaries. Renner bluntly told his landlotds that the missionaties would help them to fight against the Fula, who I JRA39,·U46_f2....1-28.indd 17 B. L. Mouser IJournal o[Religion in Africa 39 (2009) were the river's overlords. but that they would not assist them against the British. By the time that the squadron vessel returned, the headroen refused to hand over the slaver's crew and cargo. with the consequence that the British shelled a number of local villages, killing several Fula who wete then trading in the region. Word of the battle near Lissa quickly spread into the interior, and there was concern-especially from Renner-that the Fula might send warriors to directly intervene against the British and that the missionaries would suffer as a consequence. A war conference of nearly 3,000 Baga and Susu warriors and headmen hastily convened in the upper Pongo. with obvious results. The missionaries were blamed directly, and Renner particularly, for the latest crisis, and whatever support for them that existed in the upper river rapidly disappeared. 54 Renner's life was threatened and the position of the remaining missionaries became increasingly untenable. In midyear, Renner and Wilhelm left for Freetown, where the missionaries contemplated the circumstances in the Rio Pongo. MacCarthy's advice to the Society was undisguised: 'Send us men of activity and zeal and if you cannot do so without neglecting the Rio Pongas, pray withdraw your establishment until the slave trade is excluded from thence'.55
In the following months both Rennet and WIlhelm returned temporarily to the Pongo, perhaps to give it one last chance for success. In the meantime, the Society's leadership in London had concluded that the Susu were reluctant to accept the Christian message, that they had been unappreciative of the Society's efforts from 1808 to 1817, and that MacCarthy's offer of ptotection and service in Freetown was to be considered seriously, but left the final decision to the missionaries.56 In August 1817 mysterious fires again destroyed mission buildings. The decision to abandon the missions in the upper Pongo at Bassaya and Canofee was made in November, and the missionaries left the upper river for Freetown. The Society's missions at Gambier likewise failed to produce students trained in native languages and lasted only until 1815. The mission on the Iles de Los survived only for a year, again the victim to reckless accusations of slave trading made by missionaries.57 The Kaporo mission remained active for nearly another decade, perhaps suggesting that the Society refused to completely abandon the notion of a Susu Mission until it became dear that much of the Society's objectives could be obtained through dose cooperation with authorities connected with the colony.
Conclusion
Events, correspondence from missionaries and minutes from the Society's leadership in London clearly indicate that the transition of the Society's objec-B. 1. Mo",,,. IJournal ofReligion in Africa 39 (2009) 1-28 19 dve in Africa from an exclusive focus on missions to Africans to one that included. service to the government and administrators in Freetown was an incremental and unexpected one that began even before the Susu Mission in the Rio Pengo was implemented in 1808. The decision of the missionaries in 1807 to jettison Hartwig in favor of a collective consensus and a subsequent reversal by the Society's General Committee (0 formalize an ongoing arrangement with the Company/Colony dtamatically changed the Society's coUtse on the West African coast. Not only would the Society supply the colony with a chaplain and a superintendent for its schools, but its missionaries in the Pongo would assist British policy and provide officials at Freetown with information regarding events along the coast, including persistent slave trading. To be sure, the Society continued to pursue its earlier objective of educating Africans to become catechists and eventually missionaries, but within the Pongo context that objective was frustrated by continued slave trading and by circumstances within the river that made that mission unproductive. The choice made in 1816~1817 to accept a greater administrative role and missionary presence at Freetown led to abandonment of the Susu Mission, but not necessarily the cessation of the Society's commission to learn Mrican languages and train Mricans as a vanguard for conversion. In this instance, however, conversion was to follow the flag rather than to anticipate it, and to attain it within the context and protection of British imperial policy.58
At another level, however. the Church Missionary Society was experimenting with objectives dUting its early years that emphasized repayment fot wrongs brought on Africa as a consequence of slave trading. In that instance, imperial agendas were dismissed and minimized as parcels of worldly policy, and the Society sought to distance itselffrom the trap ofsettlements and colonial entanglements. Essentially, the Society focused its early activities within a separate Susu Mission. and it acquiesced to a role within Freetown only as an unintended consequence ofcircumstances then existing on Africa's Windward Coast. Continuing slave trading and the inoppormne selection ofcontentious missionaries complicated the Society's efforts. Moreover, the presence of large and ever increasing numbers of Liberated Africans at Freetown after 1811 changed the dynamic of the Society's goals and the role that it was to play within British imperial policy. If the Society intentionally sought to maintain a distance from wotldly policy at its inception in 1799, by 1817 that had changed to at least a participatoty tole, but one that would support an agenda that emphasized service to Africans--even if that assisted imperial policy at the same time. Ajrna 39 (2009) 1-28 23. Porter 2004 : 92-98. See also Porter 1985 : 597-621. Porter (1985 cited Bishop Samuel Wilberforce as writing in 1860: 'In the first place, there is little hope ofpromoting commerce in Africa, unless Christianity is planted in it; and, in the next place, there is very little ground for hoping that Christianity will be able to make its proper way unless we can establish a lawful commerce in the country'.
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24. Ajayi (2004?) addressed the issue of church/state and mission/empire with a particular focus on interactions between Church and state in eighteenth-century Britain. Citing Walls, Ajayi reviewed the perception that evangelicals had rallied against 'nominal Christianity' in favor ofa more robust form and within a British context. In effect, the state was to be transformed, with people following afterward. In the instance of mission/empire, Ajayi suggested that many evangelicals viewed the state and empire as a gift: of'Providence' that should be exploited and nurtured. Ajayi cited the example of Henry Martyn, who went to India in 1806 and saw no contradiction in serving as both toles chaplain to the state and missionary to the populace. Indeed, Ajayi noted that many evangelicals saw slavery and the slave trade as economic issues rather than religious or ethical ones, at the same time asserting that '[flew question[edJ that Freetown was a joint project of Mission and Empire ... At the beginning of the 19th century, in spite of the legacy of the separation of Church and State, Evangelicals assumed "Christendom", and were willing to co·operate loyally with the State'. Stanley (1990: 43, 70-74) emphasized the role of humanitarian objectives in molding CMS and state objectives surrounding the slave trade question. Stanley (1990: 71) (Mouser and Mouser, eds., 2003: 78-80) .
33. Ibid.; Mouser and Mouser (2003: 41) . No correspondence in the German language was located in the archive, although there were occasional mentions that letters in Gennan had been translated. No notations on letters used in this research indicated that they had been originally written in German. Jakobsson 1972 , 57, 132, 176-182. Bledsoe (1992 wrote that 'the twO general aims of colonial authorities and missionaries-gentrification and conversion, respectively-were intertwined. Missionaries insisted that students embrace the lessons imparted in school as a sign of religious and cultural conversion. And government schools viewed Christianity as basic to a civilised society'. Bledsoe (1992: 188) (Rdigions Track Society 1836: 161) Bickersteth is quoted as having less than charitable thoughts respecting the German missionaries: 'Much as we are indebted to our German brethren, their labours are our disgrace, their Christian courage and self-denial our reproach, and in an English colony, they cannot, from their almost necessary ignorance ofour language and habits, be so acceptable as Englishmen'. Johnson (1953: 29) listed ten villages composed primarily of Liberated Africans as of 1817. Ajayi (2004?) noted that '[m]any missionaries were anxious to go and do battle in Muslim states. But they also often looked over their shoulders to see where they could expect co-operation from traders and protection from srate power '. Walls (2002: 96-97 ) described this dilemma, stating that once colonial rule was established the nature of the missionary task changed: 'No longer was their message directed to Mrkan society as it existed.... One thing in particular was demanded ofthem by government; and the same thing was demanded of them by Africans responding to the new world that had been thrust upon them: Western education.... Wave after wave of new missions came in, announcing they would be caught in no such trap, that their task was only to preach the gospel-ere long they would find it was necessary to build schools, and schools that would meet government standards '. 54 (Mouser and Mouser, eels., 2003, 146) .
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